Chicago-Kent College of Law

Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

7-1-2015

Baselines in Trust Term Extension
Alexander Boni-Saenz
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, abonisae@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alexander Boni-Saenz, Baselines in Trust Term Extension, 67 Fla. L. Rev. F. 30 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/848

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

BASELINES IN TRUST TERM EXTENSION
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz *
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................30
I.

BASELINES ................................................................................30

II.

DIVINING SETTLOR INTENT .......................................................33

CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................34
INTRODUCTION
Professor Reid Kress Weisbord’s article insightfully identifies what
may be the next battleground in the rancorous war over the Rule Against
Perpetuities: trust term extension. 1 Seeking to take advantage of the
abolition of the Rule in many states, trustees of irrevocable trusts settled
before such a change in law might petition the court to extend the term of
the trusts they administer, perhaps indefinitely. 2 Professor Weisbord is
rightly skeptical of this move, and he recommends a simple but elegant
solution: prohibiting the use of modification doctrines to add beneficiaries
not identified in the original trust document. 3
This essay makes two related points and suggests an alternative solution
for trust term extension. First, the legal analysis of trust term extension is
highly sensitive to the baseline one selects, which, in turn, incorporates
many policy preferences about dead hand control. Thus, the debate about
trust term extension risks devolving into a debate about whether or not to
abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. Second, one’s view of trust term
extension need not flow directly from one’s view of dead hand control, as
the practical problems in divining settlor intent with regard to perpetual
trusts will be shared by disputants on both sides of that debate. A reform
addressed to these concerns would permit trust term extension, but require
proponents of modification to provide clear and convincing evidence of
settlor intent to create a perpetual trust.
I. BASELINES
The Article presents trust term extension as another incarnation of the
classic tension between the rights of beneficiaries and the settlor’s wishes.4
It adds an interesting twist by pointing out another classic tension between
*
1.
Article.”
2.
3.
4.

Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Trust Term Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73 (2015). I will henceforth refer to this as “the
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 78.
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beneficiaries and trustees, who have much to gain in trustee fees from
trusts that will exist in perpetuity. 5 Setting itself up as pro-beneficiary, the
Article’s first and primary argument against trust term extension highlights
the harm to existing beneficiaries from the practice: it “would force
residuary beneficiaries who would have received an outright distribution
under the original instrument to accept a less valuable lifetime interest
under the modified trust.” 6
Trust term extension certainly impairs existing beneficiaries’ interests,
but it would also provide concrete benefits to future potential beneficiaries
who would be added to the trust. The loss experienced by existing
beneficiaries’ through the conversion of their interests into a different and
less valuable form is their successor beneficiaries’ gain. Thus, these groups
have interests that are in direct conflict with each other. What makes this
situation different from other successive beneficiary conflicts, however, is
that these future beneficiaries do not exist (yet), and trustees thus owe them
no duties. 7 But this theoretical tension still reveals that “beneficiaries” are
not necessarily a singular class, existing in opposition to either the settlor
or the trustee. Some subset of potential beneficiaries might find common
cause with settlors who want perpetual trusts or trustees who want to
convert the trusts they administer into them.
Recognizing this theoretical conflict between classes of beneficiaries is
significant because it exposes the implicit choice of baseline in the
Article’s legal analysis. 8 The baseline used is the current state of affairs, or
the trust instrument as written. The Article’s second argument against trust
term extension makes this explicit, in reasoning that the equitable
deviation doctrine typically only considers what is contained in the finally
executed trust instrument, rather than “entertain[ing] a reconsideration of
the settlor’s original intent.” 9 In this context, the trust instrument
incorporates a definite end point as the trust must comply with the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Thus, it also incorporates a policy preference in favor
of restrictions on dead hand control embodied in some form by the Rule. A
particular type of legal analysis follows. The beneficiaries identified in the
trust document are presented as possessing the entitlement to trust assets in
a certain form, and change in that status quo brings them harm.

5. Id. at 87–88.
6. Id. at 95–96.
7. The most relevant duty may be the duty of impartiality, requiring the trustee give “due
regard to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (2000).
8. See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning:
The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 914 (1989) (“The starting points—or
baselines—for legal argument help explain outcomes.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 902–03 (1987) (analyzing how using the common law as a baseline affects
one’s constitutional analysis).
9. Weisbord, supra note 1, at 97.
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This baseline is a reasonable one, but it is not the only one. What if,
instead, we use the settlor’s intent as the baseline? 10 Some nontrivial
portion of settlors would likely have desired to create perpetual or nearperpetual trusts. 11 Thus, the preferred trust of many settlors is one in which
many generations of beneficiaries would be represented, instead of the
truncated trust that was required by the more restrictive law at the time of
the trust’s creation. Under a baseline of settlor intent, and assuming the
settlor wanted a perpetual trust, the entitlement to trust assets belongs not
only to the beneficiaries identified in the trust document, but also to future
beneficiaries who were not permitted into that document because of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. In this framing, trust term extension becomes an
important corrective. The trust reverts back to its ideal form as imagined by
the settlor, restoring to all those beneficiaries benefits to which they were
denied by laws restricting dead hand control to an arbitrary number of
years.
Thus, the choice of baseline affects the legal analysis, and the choice of
baseline likely reflects a set of normative priors about dead hand control.12
This makes the discussion over trust term extension largely derivative of
the debate over the Rule Against Perpetuities. This point occasionally
bubbles to the surface, for instance in the Article’s third argument against
trust term extension: “modifying a trust to create new beneficial interests
for future generations of the settlor’s descendants undermines the trust law
requirement of a definite, ascertainable beneficiary.” 13 The lack of an
ascertainable beneficiary is a problem with legally permitting perpetual
trusts at all rather than being a problem with allowing trust term extension
per se.

10. This is also not an unreasonable starting point. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in
determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is
given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”). The Article does consider arguments that use
a baseline of settlor intent. See Weisbord, supra note 1, at 94–95. However, after considering the
arguments against trust term extension, it rather quickly concludes without further argument that
“[o]n balance, the arguments against trust term extension would seem to greatly outweigh those in
favor.” Id. at 99.
11. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 362 (2005) (noting
that settlors have taken their trust business to certain states that have abolished the Rule Against
Perpetuities).
12. Part IV of the Article could be seen as an argument about which baseline to select, by
seeing which trend, towards or away from dead hand control, is dominant. With significant
movement in both directions, though—from the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities on the
one hand to the evolution of various trust doctrines on the other—it is hard to establish a clear
winner in this exercise.
13. Weisbord, supra note 1, at 97–98.
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II. DIVINING SETTLOR INTENT
Must one’s view of trust term extension flow directly from one’s
normative view of the Rule Against Perpetuities and dead hand control?
Not necessarily. The Article’s last argument against trust term extension
presents a way out: “applying equitable deviation in this context would
present a significant risk of misinterpreting the settlor’s intent, particularly
in cases where the settlor is deceased or incapacitated.” 14 In other words, it
might be difficult to determine with certainty whether a settlor actually
wanted a perpetual trust at all. The entity responsible for bringing the
question before the court—the trustee—is seriously conflicted on that very
issue. This argument emphasizes practical concerns about the
implementation of trust term extensions.
The Article endorses a reform that would prohibit the addition of
beneficiaries not identified in the original trust document through trust
modification doctrines. 15 This reform has much to recommend it, most
notably its ease of implementation. It is also theoretically justified, if one
has a normative preference for restrictions on dead hand control. It may not
be appealing, however, to those who are either in favor of perpetuities
reform or ambivalent about it. These groups may still not favor unrestricted
trust term extension, given the practical difficulties of determining settlor
intent, but they may be open to it.
A more modest reform might be attractive to all of these constituencies,
creating a form of overlapping consensus. Instead of prohibiting trust term
extension altogether, one could merely require clear and convincing
evidence of settlor intent to create a perpetual trust before permitting trust
term extension under modification doctrines. This heightened evidentiary
standard would put the burden of proving settlor intent on the proponent of
trust term extension. In addition, it is an approach that is consistent with
how both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement deal with the
analogous area of reformation of wills. 16 The rationale that applies to
reformation also applies here:
Tilting the risk of an erroneous factual determination in this
fashion is appropriate because the party seeking reformation
is seeking to establish that a donative document does not
reflect the donor’s intention. This tilt also deters a potential
plaintiff from bringing a reformation suit on the basis of
insubstantial evidence. 17
14. Id. at 98–99.
15. Id. at 123.
16. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-805 (2008, as amended 2010) (adopting a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard for reformation of even unambiguous terms in wills); see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 10, at § 12.1 (2003).
17. Id. at § 12.1 cmt. e (2003).
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The heightened evidentiary requirement in the case of trust term
extension will prevent trust modifications that were not clearly desired by
the settlor and also prevent trustees from depriving existing beneficiaries of
rights without substantial evidence that the settlor would have wanted it
that way. While this solution does not stop the expansion of perpetual
trusts through trust modification doctrines completely, it likely does ensure
that it will only occur when the settlor actually desired it.
CONCLUSION
If the question of trust term extension eventually does reach a court, as
it may, the presiding judge’s view of the case will likely be influenced by
her underlying policy preferences about dead hand control. This, in turn,
will likely determine which baselines she adopts for the legal analysis.
However, Professor Weisbord’s Article identifies a different set of
practical concerns that may worry those of multiple ideological stripes.
These concerns point to a particular reform: heightening evidentiary
requirements for proponents of trust term extension to ensure that
modification to make a trust perpetual in fact represents the settlor’s intent.

